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Although the term ―anti-counterfeiting‖ suggests an agreement limited to 
preventing trade in counterfeit products, ACTA’s draft provisions, to date,
2
 
would set new minimum enforcement standards for a range of intellectual 
property rights. In several areas, these standards could impede legitimate 
competition, shortchange legal process and shift costs of enforcing private 
commercial rights to the public.   
The parties to ACTA have agreed to narrow some of its provisions in 
recent months.  Despite these improvements to its text, ACTA continues to 
present risks for global access to medicines, including potentially restricting 
free transit of generics, imposing chilling effects on the medicines trade, and 
limiting flexibilities in intellectual property (IP) rules.  
The parties have cited protecting consumers from unsafe products as a 
primary benefit of ACTA.  But among IP infringements, only willful 
trademark counterfeiting of potentially dangerous classes of products poses a 
categorical public safety risk.  Outside the context of counterfeiting, IP 
infringement analysis is not related to health.  Moreover, ACTA diverts 
attention and resources away from more direct and comprehensive public 
safety measures.  
ACTA’s most significant public health costs may come from its narrative 
positioning and precedent.  ACTA does not adequately distinguish between 
criminal activity and civil infringements occurring in the context of market 
competition—a problem that concerns consumer groups and intellectual 
property owners alike.  
Several parties to ACTA now rightly suggest narrowing the agreement’s 
scope altogether.  Public health analysis leads to the conclusion that ACTA 
should be scaled back to cover only willful commercial scale trademark 
counterfeiting.  
 
                                         
1
 Access to Medicines Program Director,  Public Citizen.  
2
 This paper refers to the August 25, 2010 draft unless otherwise noted.  Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:  Aug. 25, 2010, 
PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow 
―Full Leaked Text Dated August 25, 2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 
2010]. 
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I. OVERVIEW:  ACTA & PUBLIC HEALTH 
 
Although the term ―anti-counterfeiting‖ suggests an agreement limited to 
preventing trade in counterfeit products, ACTA’s draft provisions, to date, 
would set new minimum enforcement standards for a range of intellectual 
property rights.  In several areas, these standards could impede legitimate 
competition, shortchange legal process, and shift costs of enforcing private 
commercial rights to the public.  ACTA’s draft text blurs key distinctions 
between market competition and criminal activity and takes a step toward 
creating de facto international intellectual property regimes.  Under its 
broader proposed terms, ACTA, not unlike a counterfeit, misrepresents its 
true ingredients to the public.  
Some of ACTA’s draft provisions continue to present risks for global 
access to medicines.  These include potentially restricting the free transit of 
3 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-09 
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lifesaving and cost-lowering generic medicines.  ACTA could impose 
potentially chilling effects on the medicines trade and limit the use of key 
flexibilities in intellectual property rules.  ACTA could make it easier for 
major pharmaceutical companies to seek to limit or deter generic market entry 
worldwide by projecting national intellectual property regimes into the 
customs regulation of global trade.  Even given recent improvements to its 
text, ACTA could still establish the scope of the European Union’s 
controversial customs regulation 1383/2003
3
—which has led to customs 
actions stopping lifesaving medicines in transit to developing countries—as a 
default international norm.  
Expanding an anti-counterfeiting agreement beyond counterfeits does not 
similarly expand its benefits to consumers.  Willful, commercial scale 
trademark counterfeiting is a criminal offense under the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS)
4
 and appropriately targeted by law enforcement.  But civil IP 
infringements—including among others patent and ―similar‖ trademarks or 
trade dress—are not criminal acts, and do not generally represent a fraud on 
the public.  Civil infringements are typically commercial disputes between 
legitimate entities, for which traditional legal remedies are and should be 
available.  Civil infringements do not require preemptive law enforcement 
interdiction, be it ex officio or on a rights holder application, wherever they 
appear in the channels of commerce.  Instead, assessing infringement requires 
judicial process, and often expert legal analysis, that is outside the 
competence of customs and other law enforcement authorities.  
ACTA’s draft text does not adequately distinguish between criminal 
activity and civil infringement.  The Intellectual Property Owners Association 
and other industry groups share this concern.
5
  Major businesses commonly 
find themselves on either side of infringement disputes.  ACTA’s draft terms 
would impose legal uncertainty and costs, while tainting commercial disputes 
with the air of criminality.  Indeed, it is difficult to identify compelling public 
rationales for many of ACTA’s provisions, or the proposed ongoing work of 
                                         
3
 Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 [hereinafter Council Reg. 
1383/2003]. 
4
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 61, 108 
Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
5
 Intellectual Property Owners Association letter to USTR (June 25, 2010) available at 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.c
fm&CONTENTID=26347.  See also ―ECIS' concerns on the impact of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ("ACTA"),‖ European Committee for Interoperable 
Systems,’ Sept. 17, 2010, available at: 
http://www.ecis.eu/documents/ECISACTApositionpaper.pdf. 
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an ACTA Committee, when applied to civil infringements.  
The parties to ACTA have cited protecting consumers from unsafe 
products as a primary benefit of the agreement.  But among intellectual 
property infringements, only willful trademark counterfeiting of certain 
potentially dangerous classes of products poses a categorical public safety 
risk.  Willful counterfeit medicines, by definition and by din of being illegal, 
are not registered with drug regulatory authorities and hence not regulated—
and therefore cannot be considered safe for consumption.   
By contrast, civil infringements do not pose an inherent safety risk. 
Outside the context of counterfeiting, IP infringement analysis is not 
reasonably related to health, and does not contribute to public safety.  Instead, 
expanding ACTA’s scope to cover civil infringements targets market 
competition preemptively, including registered generic medicines, without 
benefits to public safety, and to the detriment of public health interests 
including access to medicines.  Moreover, ACTA diverts resources and 
attention away from more direct and comprehensive measures to protect the 
public from unsafe products.   
This white paper reviews some of the proposed ACTA terms that create 
risks for access to medicines, and offers suggestions for improvement. The 
paper then clarifies the relationship between classes of infringement and 
health and safety, and reviews the harmful precedent ACTA could set by 
treating alleged civil infringements and market activity under the narrative of 
counterfeiting. This public health analysis leads to the conclusion that ACTA 
should be scaled back to cover only criminal, willful, commercial scale 
trademark counterfeiting.  
 
II. ACCESS TO MEDICINES: ACTA'S CONTINUING RISKS 
 
Market competition plays a key role in improving global access to 
medicines by reducing costs over time to levels where governments and 
donors can scale-up treatment coverage.  For example, over the last ten years, 
global competition and generic medicines have produced a revolution in 
HIV/AIDS treatment, reducing prices from $10,000 to $100 per person per 
year in developing countries, and enabling more than five million people 
worldwide to access lifesaving antiretroviral therapy.  Competition remains 
every bit as vital today to expand access to new drugs, including among many 
others expensive second and third-line HIV/AIDS treatments. 
 
A. Impeding the Transit of Generics 
 
ACTA’s text no longer requires countries to provide special preemptive 
5 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-09 
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border measures for patents.  Nevertheless, the Border Measures section may 
still prejudice the interests of competition and access.  To improve the scope 
of ACTA’s Border Measures section, the parties should reject the 
EU/Switzerland proposal, and adopt in its place a sole, modified 
US/Sing/Aus/NZ/J/Can provision:  ―Parties shall provide for the provisions 
related to border measures to be applied in cases of [willful] trade mark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy [on a commercial scale].‖
6
 
ACTA’s proposed Border Measures have raised concerns from the first 
leaked draft.  Under some early proposals, ACTA would have required 
countries to empower customs agents to seize medicines on mere suspicion or 
rights holder allegation of patent infringement, ahead of judicial process, even 
if the medicines were simply in transit through the port. This mirrors what has 
happened under European Council Regulation 1383/2003.
7
  Many times, 
customs agents detained or seized shipments of generic medicines from India 
en route to other developing countries.
8
  While not all case details are 
available, it is clear that in some instances the medicines were not even under 
patent in India or the destination country. India and Brazil have since initiated 
procedures at the WTO to review the TRIPS compliance of Council 
Regulation 1383/2003, and some legal scholars argue the regulation may 




Enforcement measures that rights holders can trigger automatically and ex 
parte are prone to abuse.  Measures that customs authorities take on their own 
initiative, ex officio, are prone to inaccuracy and over enforcement.  Generics 
firms are often smaller than patent-based pharmaceutical firms, and operate 
on lower margins of return.  Special border measures could jeopardize not 
only particular shipments of generic medicines, but the business model for the 
relatively small-scale generics industry, and the access to medicines interests 
that rely on it.  In response to the medicines detentions, several Indian 
generics producers are reported to have altered economical transshipment 
through Europe in favor of alternative and more costly routes.  Diversion of 
such medicines from Europe could also risk the storage and distribution 
                                         
6
  ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Sec. 2, Art. 2.X:  Scope of the Border 
Measures. 
7
 Council Reg. 1383/2003, supra note 3. 
8
 Press Release, Health Action International, Another seizure of generic medicines 




 For a discussion of territoriality, GATT Article V, TRIPS and implications for border 
measures applied to in transit goods, see XAVIER SEUBA, FREE TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
PRODUCTS:  THE LIMITS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDER 16 
(ICTSD, ed. 2010). 
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practices of health-related NGOs that use warehouses in Europe as way 
stations for products eventually distributed to developing countries in Africa 
and Latin America.   
But the most unfortunate consequence of such border measures could be 
wrongly tethering the public image of generic drugs to that of counterfeits 
requiring concerted police action.  This danger is not speculative.  Medical 
professionals worldwide struggle against stigma and propaganda that 
insinuates generics represent second-class treatment.  Recent East African 
anti-counterfeiting bills effectively criminalize the generics trade, by 
extending criminal penalties to infringements of any intellectual property right 
held anywhere in the world.  ACTA, as a flagship IP enforcement proposal, 
must actively discourage, rather than encourage, the trend to treat generics 
and civil infringement claims with policing measures designed for 
counterfeits.  
 
1. Improvements and Outstanding Concerns 
 
Access to medicines concerns and controversy seem to have persuaded the 
ACTA parties to revise the agreement’s text.  ACTA no longer requires 
countries to apply extraordinary border measures to patents.  This is a clear 
and important improvement, and some negotiators and trade officials now 
maintain that this resolves any access concerns in the agreement.  However, 
there are at least two outstanding concerns in ACTA’s border measures.  
 
a.  The EU’s Proposed Default Rule 
 
First, the EU/Switzerland proposal still assumes a default position that 
ACTA’s border measures will apply to all classes of intellectual property, 
including patents.  Countries may exclude patents if they choose:  ―[EU/CH]: 
For the purposes of this section, ‗goods infringing an intellectual property 
right‘ means goods infringing any of the intellectual property rights covered 
by TRIPS.*  However, Parties may decide to exclude from the scope of this 
section, certain rights other than trademarks, copyrights and GIs…‖
10
 
A default rule such as this, even if not a requirement, still establishes a 
norm.  If the parties adopt the EU/CH proposal, then ACTA would promote a 
presumption in favor of applying special border measures to patents wherever 
the agreement’s considerable influence may extend.  
Emerging global IP enforcement trends make this concern all the more 
                                         
10
  ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Ch. 2, Sec. 2, provisions on Scope.  [* 
The provisions of this section shall also apply to confusingly similar trademark goods.]. 
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salient.  EC Council Regulation 1383/2003 still applies to patents (although it 
is under review).  The EU is exporting similar standards through economic 
partnership agreements.  East African nations are debating new laws, 
regulations and proposed laws that impose much broader and harsher boarder 
measures.  An ACTA assumption that preemptive border measures—ex ante, 
ex parte, ex officio—should commonly apply to patents, even with safeguards 
in place, still lends legitimacy and momentum to a flawed idea.  Adopting the 
recommended and modified US/Sing/Aus/NZ/J/Can provision, above, would 
correct this particular problem.  
 
b. Civil Trademark Claims 
 
Second, and also under the EU/Switzerland proposal, ACTA would still 
require countries to apply special border measures to geographic indicators 
and to all classes of trademark and copyright infringement—not only willful 
counterfeiting and piracy.  The inclusion of civil trademark claims in ACTA’s 
border measures creates risks for access to medicines similar to those raised 
by patents.  
In intellectual property usage, the term ―counterfeit‖ applies correctly to a 
subset of trademark infringement.  Under the TRIPS Agreement,
11
 
―counterfeit trademark goods shall mean any goods, including packaging, 
bearing without authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark 
validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished 
in its essential aspects from such a trademark[.]‖  This definition is 
incorporated into the latest ACTA text under General Definitions (previously 
at footnote 23).   
A trademark counterfeit is distinct from a case in which the commercial 
design or packaging of one firm’s registered medicine is alleged to create a 
―likelihood of confusion‖
12
 with another firm’s established trademark.  For 
example, pharmaceutical firms sometimes give their products commercial 
names derived in part from an active ingredient’s international nonproprietary 
name (INN).
13
  Branded and generic products based on the same active 
ingredient may therefore bear similar names.  Generic medicines also 
sometimes feature packaging or pill design with similar qualities to 
                                         
11
 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 51 n. 14. 
12
 See, e.g., id. art. 16.1; Council Directive 89/104/EEC Art. 5.1(b), 1989 O.J. (L 40) 
replaced by Council Directive 2008/95/EC Art. 5, 2008 O.J. (L 299/25) ; and Trade Marks 
Act of 1994, 1994, c. 26, § 10.2 (U.K.).  For US and EU case articulations of the ―likelihood 
of confusion‖ standard, see infra note 15.  
13
 See, e.g., Chan S. Park, Legal Aspects of Defining ―Counterfeit Medicines‖:  A 
Discussion Paper, (World Health Org. Regional Office for South-East Asia, 2009). 
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established marks, specifically because the products are therapeutically 
equivalent, and designed for consumers’ interchangeable use.  Many 
pharmacies place generics on their shelves next to brand-name products, often 
featuring somewhat similar coloring or designs.
14
  Similar packaging is used 
to communicate a similar (bioequivalent) product.  Policy goals favoring 
generic substitution support this general practice.  
Similar marketing names or similar packaging for drugs sometimes do 
form the basis of civil trademark infringement claims.  Trademark owners 
have a legitimate commercial interest in defending their marks.  Judicial 
recourse is, and should be, available in such circumstances.  But in neither 
case has the generics manufacturer fraudulently misrepresented the source or 
identity of its product.  And neither would be properly termed 
―counterfeiting.‖ 
ACTA should reflect this distinction.  Civil trademark claims typically 
require a weighing of many factors.
15
  Assessing infringement requires legal 
process and analysis outside the competence of customs authorities.  Notably, 
courts have tended to grant narrower trademark and trade dress protection to 
pharmaceuticals than to other classes of products.
16
  This is due to the 
functionality of pill design, as well as the consumer interests served by 
communicating bioequivalence.  The risk is high that customs agents, 
encouraged to stop as much infringing activity as possible, would sometimes 
apply trademark infringement standards too zealously.  At least one recent EU 
customs detention of generic medicines in transit cited—wrongly, it turned 
                                         
14
 See e.g., Sean Flynn & Amy Kapczynski, Counterfeit Versus "Confusingly Similar" 
Products, PIJIP BLOG (May 7, 2010), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/pijip05072010.  
15
 In the United States, federal courts tend to apply multifactor tests, such as these from 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to measure ―likelihood of confusion‖:  strength of the 
mark, proximity of the goods, similarity of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, 
marketing channels used, type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the 
purchaser, defendant’s intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of expansion of the product 
lines.  AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9
th
 Cir. 1979).  The court noted, ―the 
list is not exhaustive.  Other variables may come into play depending on the particular facts 
presented.‖  Id. at 348 n. 11.  See also Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 
(2d Cir.1961).  
In regard to European standards for analyzing a community trademark under First 
Council Directive, 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L40) 1, art. 5.1(b), courts use a "global 
assessment test" which requires all circumstances of and surrounding the good be taken into 
account. Factors include assumption of an "ordinary consumer" viewpoint, overall impression 
of the mark, level of distinctiveness, weight of similarity of the goods against similarity of the 
marks, risk of public confusion as to economic source of the goods.  See Case C–251/95, 
Sabel v. Puma, 1997 E.C.R. I-6191; Case C–39/1997, Canon v. MGM, 1998 E.C.R. I-5507; 
Case C–342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, 1999 E.C.R. 
I-3819; Case C–425/98, Marca Mode CV v. Adidas AG, 2000 E.C.R. I-4861. 
16
 See Public Citizen Research Note, ―Trademark and Trade Dress Infringement 
Standards for Generic Pharmaceuticals,‖ Arielle Singh, July 31, 2010 [on file with author]; 
see also, e.g., Shire U.S., Inc., v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348, 344-35 (3d Cir. 2003).   





  And the potential for spurious 
claims and rights holder abuse applies to civil trademark infringement much 
as it does to patents.   
A better standard would target willful counterfeits specifically and 
exclusively. There may be reason to distinguish between cases of willful 
trademark counterfeiting and cases of arguable counterfeiting where no intent 
to fraudulently misrepresent source is evident.  Note the TRIPS definition of 
counterfeiting does not require a showing of intent.  The ―substantially 
indistinguishable mark‖ counterfeiting standard could also be different in 
some limited cases than a standard of fraudulent misrepresentation of source.  
Perhaps one firm could use a packaging design nearly identical to an 
established design, but employ a different name.  This could amount to 
―substantially indistinguishable‖ use of a mark or trade dress classifying the 
product, in some analysis, as counterfeit, but it might still represent more an 
effort to indicate similarity (or bioequivalence) to the first product than an 
effort to claim the product is actually produced by the other company.  
Notably, TRIPS creates an enforcement distinction between counterfeiting 
in general and cases of ―willful trademark counterfeiting on a commercial 
scale,‖ the latter being subject to criminal penalties (Article 61).  This is the 
appropriate standard for special border measures intended to target activity 
that cannot be adequately addressed by civil judicial process.  While the intent 
of the alleged infringer may not always be evident, this is initially true of 
many law enforcement targets.  It remains important to apply the legal 
standard most rationally related to the policy goal of stopping criminal 
counterfeiting, and to maintain a clear and consistent distinction between 
alleged civil infringement and criminal activity in enforcement procedures.   
                                         
17
 According to Health Action International:  
A shipment of the antibiotic, Amoxicillin, manufactured in India and 
destined for the Republic of Vanuatu in the Pacific, was seized by customs 
officials on 5 May, 2009, while in transit through Frankfurt, Germany. 
Amoxicillin is an essential medicine used to treat a wide range of bacterial 
infections.  In this latest case, customs authorities seized a shipment of 3,047,000 
pills of Amoxicillin (250 mg), worth approximately 28,000 Euros for four weeks 
before releasing it to Vanuatu. The batch was detained on grounds of suspected 
trademark infringement. This quantity of tablets is equivalent to 76,000 courses 
of treatment. Customs authorities then informed GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), which 
received the letter on 13 May. Seven days later, GSK informed the German 
customs authorities that there was no trademark infringement. GSK is the former 
patent holder for ―Amoxil‖, a brand name amoxicillin. There is no valid reason 
for detaining these medicines especially since the name ―Amoxicillin‖ is an 
international nonproprietary name (INN). 
Press Release, Health Action International, Another seizure of generic medicines destined for 
a developing country, this time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.haiweb.org/19062009/5%20Jun%202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure%20of
%20generic%20medicines%20in%20Frankfurt.pdf.  
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B. Imposing Chilling Effects on the Medicines Trade 
 
ACTA’s proposed norms on liability still leave too much uncertain.  A 
particular area of concern, requiring greater attention and scrutiny from the 
Parties, is intermediary liability.  An EU/Switzerland proposal would provide 
for general availability of injunctive relief against ―intermediaries whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right.‖
18
  
In the context of pharmaceuticals, such injunctions might include, for 
example, orders to cease sales to a generics firm.  Intermediaries might 
include shippers and the manufacturers of active pharmaceutical ingredients, 
and potentially reach or influence the medicines procurement decisions of 
agencies such as the Global Fund.  The uncertain reach of injunctions could 
contribute to a chilling market for medicines.  A new note available from law 
professor Brook Baker describes in further detail the potentially disruptive 
effect of a broad ACTA intermediary liability provision on the global 
medicines trade.
19
    
ACTA's Article 2.4, ―Information Related to Infringement,‖ would require 
countries to make available, upon justified request of the right holder, court 
orders requiring alleged infringers to identify distributors and other business 
partners or contractors throughout the production chain.  This provision opens 
up possibilities for rights holders to harass contractors that work with their 
competition.  The provision becomes more concerning when taken in concert 
with recent proposed U.S. legislation to establish lists of importers that ―have 
a history of attempting to import goods that infringe intellectual property 
rights‖
20
 and of ―low-risk importers.‖
21
  If these and similar proposals are 
applied broadly to civil infringements, as is currently proposed, contractors in 
the medicines supply chain could reason that working with generics firms 
attracts unwanted negative attention, and that their business interests might be 
better served working with rights holders.   
More generally, if ACTA’s scope remains broad, low-capitalized generics 
firms (as well as major transnational companies which also defend against 
infringement claims) will have to account for uncertainty and new potential 
                                         
18
 ACTA Section 1:  Civil Enforcement, Article 2.X Injunctions 2, ACTA Draft – Aug. 
25, 2010, supra note 2.   
19
 Brook K. Baker, ACTA – Risks of Intermediary Liability in Access to Medicines, (PIJIP 
Research Paper No. 1, American Univ. Washington College of Law, Sept. 2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=research. 
20
 Customs Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 1631, 
111th Cong. § 234 (2009). 
21
 Trade Enforcement Act of 2009, S. 1466, 111th Cong. § 225 (2009).  
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C. Limiting Flexibilities in Intellectual Property Rules 
 
Knowledge Ecology International has written extensively on ACTA’s 
evolving, but as yet inadequate, allowance for flexibility on damages rules 
and the availability of injunctions.
23
  Under TRIPS Article 44.2, countries are 
not required to make injunctive relief available in all circumstances, because 
other important national interests, such as reducing medicine costs through the 
government use of patents or keeping health products on the market, could be 
compromised.
24
  Similarly, rigid damages and injunctions rules can limit 
innovation, by uniformly seeking to prevent or punish infringement, rather 
than providing adequate compensation in those particular cases where use of a 
proprietary invention might advance technological development. 
KEI has pointed out that ACTA’s provisions on damages and injunctions 
may conflict with numerous national laws affecting many economic sectors.  
Here, again, limiting ACTA’s scope would reduce the number of potential 
conflicts.  A separate helpful step would be to adopt the 
Canada/Australia/Singapore proposal expressly subjecting ACTA’s civil 





III. PUBLIC SAFETY 
 
Parties to ACTA have frequently cited the agreement as a means to 
protect the public from unsafe counterfeit products.  But most classes of 
intellectual property infringements do not raise health and safety concerns by 
their nature.  Criminal trademark counterfeiting can be an exception, and can 
be appropriately targeted ex officio by law enforcement under the TRIPS 
Agreement.  However, criminal trademark counterfeiting should be 
distinguished not only from patents and other classes of intellectual property, 
but also from civil trademark infringement involving similar marks, product 
names and trade dress.  If ACTA’s scope remains broad, its public health 
costs are likely to outweigh its benefits. 
                                         
22
 See ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Art. 2.12.  
23
 See James Love, Comments on ACTA Provisions on Damages and Injunctions, 
Knowledge Ecology International, April 6, 2010, available at: 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/kei_rn_2010_1.pdf.  
24
 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, Art. 44.2. 
25
 See ACTA Draft – August 25, 2010, supra note 2, Sec. 1, Art. 2.X:  Injunctions.  
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A. Patents and Supplementary Protection Certificates 
 
Patent infringement analysis is not related to counterfeiting, fraudulent 
misrepresentation of source, health or safety.  Patent infringement pertains to 
alleged use of claimed proprietary inventions, not to fake marks, deliberate 
mislabeling or absent required assessments of safety.  Indeed, patent 
infringement cases allege putting the patented technology to use.  In almost all 
cases, the alleged infringer is attempting to manufacture or market a 
legitimate medicine.  Patent infringement actions are civil and commercial 
disputes.  Rather than protecting public health, imprecise or overly broad 
patent enforcement measures could obstruct competition and potentially risk 
access to medicines. 
Supplementary protection certificates are patent extensions for medicines, 




Copyright analysis is not reasonably related to health or safety.  More 
particularly, copyright analysis should not be used to challenge the content of 
product textual labeling, which is often required by drug regulatory 
authorities.   
 
C. Geographical Indications 
 
The use, or misuse, of a place name does not reveal the safety of the 
product.  Even if a company appropriates the name of a region to indicate 
characteristics of a product or a production method, rather than its place of 




D. Trademarks—Willful counterfeiting vs. civil, similar infringement 
 
Even in the trademark context, civil infringements (e.g., ―similar‖ marks 
and dress) do not pose a general risk to public health.  Among IP 
infringements, only willful trademark counterfeiting of potentially dangerous 
classes of products can be said to pose such an inherent risk.  
                                         
26
 Arguments to the contrary would require that a product’s safety depend on a particular 
place of origin or production.  It is hard to think of such an example to which Geographical 
Indications could apply.  Arguments that a place name confuses consumers or that a particular 
product’s characteristics or quality depends on the place of production are distinct from 
arguments that its safety is so dependent.   
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In order to be a willful trademark counterfeit, a product must fraudulently 
misrepresent its source by counterfeiting a protected mark.  Such a product 
could not be approved by a drug regulatory authority.  The imitated medicine 
may be approved, but the counterfeit is not.
27
  In other words, willful 
trademark counterfeit medicines, by definition and by din of being illegal, are 
not registered with drug regulatory authorities, and hence not regulated—and 
therefore cannot be considered safe for consumption.  In medicines, the 
TRIPS standard for criminal trademark infringement—willful trademark 
counterfeiting on a commercial scale—is a category that rightly triggers 
public health concern.  It is appropriate that law enforcement, including 
customs authorities, intervene in such circumstances. 
But medicines (or other goods) that correctly describe their source and 
ingredients, yet bear a similar marketing name, symbol or pill design that 
could infringe a protected trademark or trade dress, cannot be said to pose 
such a risk.  Law enforcement actions that detain or impose extrajudicial costs 
on companies for their use of similar marks do not protect the public from 
unsafe medicines or target criminal enterprises.  Rather, these actions 




Public safety arguments do not support expanding ACTA’s scope beyond 
willful trademark counterfeiting. 
 
E. ACTA‘s Opportunity Cost for Direct Public Safety Measures 
 
Criminal, willful trademark counterfeit medicines are unsafe.  But some 
falsified and unsafe medicines do not misappropriate qualifying trademarks, 
and hence fall beyond trademark law’s reach.  These include some falsified 
and fraudulently mislabeled medicines termed ―counterfeits‖ by the World 
Health Organization and other health agencies.  Trademark and intellectual 
property are ultimately indirect and under inclusive frameworks for 
combating these falsified medicines.  Trademark and IP are also inadequate to 
address the more common problems of quality shortfalls, inefficacy and 
pharmaceutical fraud.  
Indeed some and perhaps many of the examples of other unsafe products 
mentioned as motives for ACTA and other IP enforcement measures are 
unlikely to be counterfeits in the trademark sense.  Rather than 
misappropriating a protected mark, these fakes are likely to be counterfeits 
                                         
27
 If in some unlikely scenario, the counterfeit’s producer sought marketing approval for 
the counterfeit, the application itself would necessarily be fraudulent.   
28
 See also CAMPAIGN FOR ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, PATIENTS FIRST:  ACCESS 
TO SAFE, QUALITY, AND EFFECTIVE DRUGS, (Medecins Sans Frontières, ed. Apr. 2010). 
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within the meaning of the laws or regulatory frameworks typically governing 
their product class—for example, unapproved electrical components, aircraft 
parts, and medicines.  Intellectual property is not the most effective 
framework for addressing most of these safety concerns.  Instead, their 
respective regulatory frameworks are.  Trademark law may not reach many of 
them. 
Drug regulatory authority typically provides a more complete framework 
for addressing falsified medicines.  Selling a falsified or adulterated medicine 
is typically a criminal offense, whether it infringes a trademark or not.  A 
pharmaceutical product that fraudulently misrepresents its source or 
ingredients is, inherently and necessarily, not registered or approved for sale, 
and can be removed from the channels of commerce in accordance with drug 
regulatory authority.  In this sense, inspection for fake packaging is even more 
a traditional consumer protection and drug regulatory test than it is a 
trademark law test.  Drug regulatory authority can be, and often is, coupled 
appropriately with law enforcement to target falsified medicines, criminal 
activity and threats to public safety directly, rather than through a filtering 
prism of commercial IP rights.  
New attention to extraordinary intellectual property enforcement measures 
may come at an opportunity cost for attention to more direct and effective 
consumer protection and drug regulatory frameworks.  Officially, ―nothing in 
[ACTA] creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as 
between enforcement of intellectual property rights and enforcement of law in 
general.‖
29
  Nevertheless, ACTA’s chapters on International Cooperation, 
Enforcement Practices, and Institutional Arrangements contemplate the 
establishment of an ACTA Committee,
30
 observatories, and consistent 
international law enforcement cooperation and technical assistance on 
intellectual property, which will necessarily entail new investments and the 
allocation of scarce law enforcement resources.   
Moreover, because ACTA and other TRIPS-plus enforcement measures 
are often advanced as means to combat unsafe products and protect 
consumers, they divert resources, public attention and political capital that 
otherwise could be harnessed to improve more direct and comprehensive 
regulatory and law enforcement measures.  
There may also be reason to examine whether rights holders or other 
commercial interests, seeking to protect consumer confidence in sometimes-
counterfeited brands, could use ACTA to argue against requirements to 
disclose what they know about fakes in the market.  Private companies often 
                                         
29
 ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Ch. One, Art. 1.2.2.  
30
 Id. at Ch. Five, Art. 5.2.   
15 PIJIP Research Paper No. 2010-09 
 
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
have the first or most complete accounts of falsified products but do not 
always share what they know.
31
  To assist in the detection of falsified 
medicines, countries could require companies to disclose information they 
have about potentially dangerous fakes in the channels of commerce, and 
share the information with global law enforcement partners.
32
  The Joint 
Strategic Plan recently announced by the U.S. Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator incorporates one such proposal.
33
  But ACTA 
includes assurances that, ―Nothing [in the referenced sections] shall require 
any Party to disclose information which . . . would prejudice the legitimate 
commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or private.‖
34
  ACTA’s 
frequent deference to confidential information could be read to limit the 
disclosure and international sharing of information that could help protect 
consumers. 
 
IV. DISTINGUISHING COMPETITION AND CRIMINALITY 
 
                                         
31
 For example, the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), formed by fourteen 
pharmaceutical companies in 2002, recorded seventy-six cases of ―counterfeiting‖ in 2004.  
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration only knew of fifty-eight.  BUKO PHARMA-
KAMPAGNE, COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES – WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS? 5 (2007) available at 
http://www.bukopharma.de/Service/Archiv/E2007_01_special.pdf [hereinafter BUKO].  
Some consider PSI’s counterfeiting database the world’s best, yet it ―is not accessible to the 
WHO, health authorities or the public.‖  Robert Cockburn et al., The global threat of 
counterfeit drugs: why industry and governments must communicate the dangers, 2 Pub. Libr. 
Sci. Med. 302, 305 (2005) [hereinafter PLoS]. 
In some cases, companies have been accused of being slow to report such knowledge, for 
fear of reducing public confidence in their brands—endangering public health in the process.  
For example, in 1995, GSK allegedly asked the Ghanaian government not to alert the public 
of the presence of fake halofantrine antimalarial syrup in the market, allegedly for the sake of 
the company’s reputation.
  
See BUKO, PLoS.  GSK also was reluctant to share information 
about fake syrup with the authors of the PLoS article.  PLoS at 305.  In 1998, the Brazilian 
government accused Schering do Brasil of failing to disclose knowledge of counterfeit 
contraceptives for thirty days (a court cancelled the government’s fine on appeal).
 
  Id.  In 
2002 in Kansas City, BMS and Eli Lilly settled for $72 million with the families of deceased 
victims of counterfeit drugs, possibly to avoid the precedent that drug companies could be 
held liable for failing to disseminate information about counterfeits.  Id.  There are, of course, 
counterexamples.  ―In 2002, Johnson and Johnson issued 200,000 letters to health care 
professionals in the US warning them of fake Procrit…within one week of being notified of a 
severe counterfeit problem.‖  Id.  
32
 For more information on proposed mandatory disclosure requirements, see Letter from 
Public Citizen to Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European 
Commission (May 25, 2010), available at  http://citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=3458 
(commenting on DG TAXUD consultation paper ―Review of EU legislation on customs 
enforcement of intellectual property rights‖).  
33
 OFFICE OF THE U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (Jun. 2010). 
34
 ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 2, Art. 3.1.4.  
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ACTA’s draft text applies extraordinary rules and ex officio law 
enforcement measures appropriate to criminal activity to the context of 
market competition and civil infringement.  Consumers and industry groups 
share this concern.  The Intellectual Property Owners Association, which 
includes major brand-name pharmaceutical companies on its Board of 
Directors, wrote USTR expressing concern that: 
 
ACTA goes far beyond addressing the subject matter of 
counterfeiting . . . [and] encompasses issues that are most 
appropriately handled as civil infringement causes of action in most 
jurisdictions around the world, and especially so in the case of the 
United States. . . . [T]he language of ACTA should be tailored to 
reflect the narrower stated purpose of an anti-counterfeiting 
agreement.  Thus, IPO urges USTR to review ACTA to ensure that 
the scope of the Act is appropriately limited to its stated purpose of 





The European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS), with 
membership including major firms such as IBM and Sun Microsystems, 
agrees, and it ―urges the European Commission to ensure that ACTA only 




Law enforcement can appropriately target willful counterfeiting by 
spotting fakes and following leads to track criminal operations.  But other 
intellectual property infringements—civil infringements, including among 
others patent and ―similar,‖ non-counterfeit trademark infringement—are not 
criminal acts and do not generally represent a fraud on the public.  Civil 
infringements are generally commercial disputes between legitimate entities, 
for which traditional legal remedies are and should be available.  The parties 
are generally known and can be served with legal process.  Because civil 
infringements are not fakes, and the parties generally do not operate in a cloak 
of secrecy in the manner of criminal organizations, they do not require 
preemptive law enforcement interdiction (be it ex officio or on a rights holder 
application) wherever they appear in the channels of commerce.   
 
A. Border Enforcement Measures 
 
                                         
35
 Intellectual Property Owners Association letter to USTR, supra note 5. 
36
 ―ECIS' concerns on the impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),‖ 
supra note 5.  
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The inclusion of civil infringements (geographical indications as well) in 
ACTA’s draft border measures section places customs authorities in the role 
of arbiters in commercial disputes.  Rights holders could use this customs 
authority to launch harassing actions against legitimate competitors.  Customs 
authorities are less prepared than courts to separate well founded from 
spurious rights holder claims.  ACTA’s limited and discretionary provisions 
providing for payment of a security,
37
 while important, may prove inadequate 
if, as seems likely, many allegations of infringement are never fully resolved.  
Moreover, customs agents operating under directives and incentives to stop as 
much infringing activity as possible will be likely to err on the side of over 
enforcement.  This will come with costs to legitimate companies including 
unwanted legal expenses and uncertainty.  This includes intellectual property 
owners, which, in the course of doing business, find themselves on each side 
of infringement disputes.  
Customs and law enforcement should be considered competent to act on 
their own authority against criminal, willful commercial scale trademark 
counterfeiting and willful commercial scale copyright piracy.  And of course, 
judicial orders or equivalent legal process can properly empower customs and 
law enforcement to take action against a particular civil infringement.  But 
customs and law enforcement are not competent to arbitrate civil intellectual 
property infringements on their own authority, or upon the mere application 




B. Goods in Transit Provisions 
 
These factors apply equally to goods entering or exiting customs territory 
and goods in transit.  But if ACTA continues to cover civil infringements, 
then any provisions applicable to goods in transit should still be limited 
specifically to criminal, willful counterfeiting and piracy.  Commercial rights 
held in one state should not impede the free movement of legitimate goods 
that are not destined for that market.  In accordance with the foundational 
principle of territoriality, intellectual property rights are state-specific (or, in 
some European Community cases, regional) in scope and application.
39
  
                                         
37
 ACTA Draft – Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 1, Art. 2.9.  
38
 Id. at Art. 2.10 states ―Each Party shall adopt or maintain a procedure by which their 
competent authorities may determine, within a reasonable period of time … whether the 
suspected infringing goods infringe an intellectual property right.‖  But law enforcement 
agencies are not competent to assess patent infringement or civil trademark claims.  And if 
defendants contest the claim of infringement, resolution of the case would seem to require 
either adversarial hearings (and perhaps litigation), leading to a longer than reasonable period 
—or shortchanging legal process.   
39
 For a discussion of territoriality, GATT Article V, TRIPS and implications for border 
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Rights held may be different in the exporting country, transit countries, and 
the destination country.  Stopping legitimate in transit goods may create a de 
facto international intellectual property regime, beyond the appropriate 
territorial scope of state authority, with global costs for competition. 
 
V. ACTA AS A NARRATIVE AND PRECEDENT 
 
ACTA’s greatest public health costs may come not from the substantive 
effects of its particular terms—even though these are potentially serious—but 
rather from its narrative positioning and precedent.  ACTA is a harbinger.  As 
an IP enforcement agreement and ongoing Committee comprising major 
economies, ACTA would establish rules and broader norms some other 
countries would follow.  The policy goals first articulated by the initial parties 
to ACTA would stand as rationales for its specific terms, and establish a 
narrative for enforcement initiatives to come.  
ACTA’s narrative suggests that intellectual property enforcement protects 
consumers from unsafe products.  A better understanding of this relationship 
is considerably more narrow and complex.  Applied prescriptively, this idea 
can be dangerous and misleading, supporting the application of incomplete 
and indirect intellectual property frameworks rather than much more effective 
and comprehensive regulatory measures against unsafe products.  IP 
enforcement training programs operated by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office are running this risk right now by advertising IP as a prime tool against 
unsafe products in countries with very limited public resources.  
ACTA shifts the historic responsibility of exercising market vigilance to 
identify infringement from private rights holders to public law enforcement, at 
a corresponding cost to taxpayers.  And while ACTA’s scope continues to 
narrow, the overarching narrative continues to suggest that the varying classes 
of intellectual property can be conflated, and treated with similar remedies to 
achieve similar ends.  ACTA, under its proposed terms, still treats many or all 
classes of infringement, including the inevitable commercial infringement 
disputes between major businesses, under the general heading ―counterfeits.‖ 
This narrative diminishes the context and flexibility that has informed the 
development of copyright, patent, and trademark law, among other classes of 
IP rules, over many years.  If all classes of alleged infringement can be 
thought of loosely and preemptively as theft, counterfeiting and piracy, a 
separate narrative supporting public interests through contextually appropriate 
remedies quickly fades.  This is part of the importance of maintaining clear 
distinctions between willful counterfeiting and civil trademark claims.  It is a 
                                                                                                          
measures applied to in transit goods, see XAVIER SEUBA, supra note 8, at16.   
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dividing line between competition and conceptions of criminality.  Allowing 
that line to slide sets a harmful legal precedent for enforcement measures and 
remedies, and supports a rigid view of intellectual property hostile to the 
flexibilities that support access to medicines and other public interests.   
The interests of public health suggest ACTA’s scope must be narrowed 
and tailored.  Otherwise, the agreement should be abandoned.
40
  More 
broadly, advocates and policy analysts should contest ACTA’s broadest 
narrative, and articulate alternative visions that support the public interests in 
safety, competition, innovation, and access over the long term. 
 
                                         
40
 For a consensus document reflecting the concerns of over ninety academics, 
practitioners and public interest organizations from six continents, see INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERTS FIND THAT PENDING ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT THREATENS 
PUBLIC INTERESTS (Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, Washington 
College of Law, ed. June 23, 2010) available at  http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-
communique.  
